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Interpreting Knowledge into Belief in the




This paper studies a particular interpretation of propositional modal
logic into propositional modal logic. Under an epistemic reading of the
modality this interpretation can be understood as taking knowledge to be
true belief. All normal modal logics of belief that under this definition
of knowledge give rise to S5 as the logic of knowledge are determined.
And all the normal modal logics of belief that give rise to S4w5 as the
logic of knowledge are determined. Among the latter KD45 shows up as
a maximal such logic.
1 Introduction
In an epistemic setting the meaning of a propositional modal formula !A can be
understood as either ‘A is known’ or ‘A is believed’. If we understand knowledge
as true belief 1 and if we have a formula F and wonder whether it holds when we
read the !’s in F as ‘knowing’ then we might consider the following reduction.
First replace each sub-formula of the form !H in F by !H ! H. Then ask
whether the resulting formula holds when the !’s are read as ‘believing’. For
this to work it is important that the notions of belief and knowledge match
up in this way, by which I mean the following. Formally speaking the above
translation, lets call it ", is an interpretation of the language of knowledge into
the language of belief. Let Lk be a logic of knowledge and Lb a logic of belief.
That these logics match up under this interpretation means that " is a faithful
interpretation of Lk into Lb. In this paper we determine all logics of belief for
which " is a faithful interpretation of S5 and of S4w5 Among the logics that
faithfully interpret S4w5, we will see that the well-known KD45 is a maximal
such logic.
!Research supported by CUNY Community College Collaborative Incentive Research
Grant 91655-0001 “Mathematical Theory of Justification”
1There are all kinds of philosophical problems with such a definition but to handle those
one needs more machinery, see [AN05b, AN05a]. In any case I don’t claim that knowledge is
true belief, but try to approach such an assumption in a formal way.
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The reader is referred to [BdRV01] for the necessary background on modal
logic, especially the notions of canonical formula, canonical models and their
use in Kripke completeness proofs, filtrations and bounded morphisms. A short
summary is given in Subsection 2.1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the necessary
modal logic machinery is presented. In Section 3 the general formal setting of
the current research is set out and two specific questions are formally stated.
These two questions are solved, using the machinery from Section 2, in Sections
4 and 5 respectively.
Acknowledgements. The author is grateful to Professor Sergei Artemov for
asking the question that led to this paper. The author would also like to thank
Bryan Renne for useful comments and suggestions.
2 Modal Logic Preliminaries
In this section we define the modal logics we will be concerned with in the rest
of this paper. In subsection 2.1 some notational conventions used in the rest
of this paper will be introduced and in subsection 2.2 we show a general result
that will be useful on two occasions later on.
To begin with, the following common schemes will pop-up frequently.
!(A # B) # !A # !B K
!A # A T
!A # !!A 4
"A # !"A 5
A # !"A B
!A # "A D
And in addition the following three less common schemes will show up.
!A !A # !!A w4
A # !(¬A # "A) wB
"A ! ¬A # !"A w5
"A ! ¬A # !(¬A # "A) ww5
The schemes w4, w5, ww5 and wB pop up automatically in the next section,
however Kw4 is known to be the logic of all topological spaces if the " is in-
terpreted as the derivative operation [Esa04].2 The author does not have any
knowledge of literature on the schemes w5, ww5 and wB though as the following
lemma shows wB is equally strong as B.
Lemma 2.1. KwB = KB
2In [Esa04] Kw4 is written as wK4.
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Proof. It is enough to show, and this is what we will do, that for any formula
A there exists a theorem X of KwB such that K $ X # (A # !"A).
Let M = %W,R, #& be a Kripke model and w ' W and assume that the
following formulas are forced at w.
A # !(¬A # "A) , (1)
A ! "A # !(¬A (!¬A # "(A ! "A)) . (2)
Suppose for a contradiction that w # A!"!¬A. Then there exists some x with
wRx # !¬A . (3)
Since w # A, wRx and w # (1) and (3) we get x # A. Now using (2) we get
x # "A, contradicting (3).
By the completeness of K we thus have
K $ (1) ! (2) # (A # !"A)
and we are done.
Definition 2.2 (Weak-transitivity). A binary relation is weakly-transitive when
xRyRz and x )= z implies xRz
Theorem 2.3. w4 is canonical for weak-transitivity
Proof. We first show that w4 is valid on all frames %W,R& where R is weakly-
transitive. Fix some forcing relation #, let x ' W and suppose x # !A ! A.
Let y, z ' W such that xRyRz. If z = x then z # A and if z )= x then by
weak-transitivity we get xRz and thus z # A.
Now we show that if L is a normal modal logic that contains all instances of
w4 then the canonical model for L is weakly transitive. Let us first show that
Kw4 $ !A !B # !!(¬A # B) . (4)
Reason in Kw4 and assume !A, B and ""(¬A!¬B). Then by w4, "(¬A!¬B)(
(¬A ! ¬B). Thus since B we have "(¬A ! ¬B) and thus "¬A, contradicting
!A and thus (4) is shown.
Now let M = %W,R, #& be the canonical model for L and suppose !R"R#
where # )= !. There exists some B such that B ' ! and B )' # (or B )' !
and B ' #, but since ! and " are maximal consistent this amounts to the
same thing). Now let !A ' !. By (4) we have !!(¬A # B) ' ! and thus
¬A # B ' #. Since B )' # we have ¬A )' # and thus A ' #.
Definition 2.4 (Weak-weak-euclidean). A binary relation is weak-weak-euclidean
when wRx wRy, w )= x and x )= y implies yRx
Theorem 2.5. ww5 is canonical for weak-weak-euclidean-ness
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Proof. Let F = %W,R& be a weak-weak-euclidean frame and let # be any forcing
relation on W . Let w, y ' W and suppose w # "F ! ¬F , wRy and y # ¬F .
We have to show that y # "F . As w # "F there exist x such that wRx and
x # F . Since y # ¬F and w # ¬F we have x )= y and x )= w and thus by
weak-weak-euclidean-ness we get yRx, which gives y # "F , and we are done.
Now let L be any normal modal logic that contains every instance of ww5
and let M = %W,R, #& be the canonical model for L. Suppose !R", !R#,
! )= " and " )= #. We have to show that #R". First fix formulas B and
C such that B,C ' ", ¬B ' ! and ¬C ' # and let !A ' #. Suppose for
a contradiction that A )' ". Then "(¬A ! B ! C) ' ! and, as ¬B ' ! also
¬(¬A!B!C) ' !. Thus by ww5 we get !(¬(¬A!B!C) # "(¬A!B!C)) ' !
and thus ¬(¬A ! B ! C) # "(¬A ! B ! C) ' #. Since ¬C ' # this implies
"(¬A !B ! C) ' # and thus "¬A ' #, a contradiction.
2.1 Notations and Conventions
Bounded morphisms With a bounded morphism we will either mean a
bounded morphism between frames or a bounded morphism between models.
The context will make clear which is meant. If P is a finite set of propositional
variables then a P -bounded morphism is a bounded morphism where the base
case is restricted to the variables in P .
Some transformations on frames and models If L is a normal modal
logic then with FpgL we denote its class of finite point-generated frames. Let
F = %W,R& be a frame and let *, • )' W . We define the frames F ! = %W !, R!&,
F " = %W ", R"& and F • = %W •, R•& as follows.
W ! = W R! = R + {%x, x& | x ' W} ,
W " = W + {*} R" = R + {%*, x& | x ' W} ,
W • = W + {•} R• = R + {%•, x& | x ' W} + {%•, •&} .
Thus F ! is the reflexive closure of F , F " is obtained by adding a non-reflexive
root to F and F • is obtained by adding a reflexive root. We sometimes use !
as a name for either * and •.
The operations ", * and • are lifted to classes of frames F in the obvious
way:
F! = {F ! | F ' F} ,
F" = {F " | F ' F} ,
F• = {F • | F ' F} .
I trust that the reader can guess how these operations lift to models and to
classes of models.
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Induced subframes and submodels Let F = %W,R $& be a frame. If
W # , W then the subframe of F induced by W # is the frame %W #, R#& where R#
is the restriction of R to W #. If w ' W then with w-+ we denote the subframe
of F induced by {x ' W | wRx, w )= x}. Again these things lift to models in
the obvious way.
Some properties of frames and models A model M is distinguishing if
for every world w there exists a formula "w such that M,u # "w i$ u = w.
A model N = %W,R, ##& is a variant of a model M = %W,R, #&. That is,
N is a variant of M when both M and N are based on the same frame. A
model N = %W,R, #& is a definable variant of a model M = %W,R, #& if for
every propositional variable p there exists a formula "p such that N,x # p i$
M,x # "p.
The crucial consequences of these properties are as follows. For a finite
distinguishing model, every variant is definable. And if a model for which ev-
ery variant is definable validates a logic L then so does its underlying frame
[BdRV01].
2.2 Logics extending Kw4ww5
In this subsection we will show that all normal modal logics extending Kw4ww5
have the finite frame property. The proof follows the idea of Fine’s proof [Fin71,
BdRV01] of Bull’s Theorem but, thanks to the simple model theory of Kw4ww5
is much simpler.
For n . 1 let
Gn = {F | /x, y(x )= y # xRy) and |F | = n} ,

















• + G!n ,
3. FpgKw4ww5 =
!
n$1 G"n + G•n + Gn .
Proof. All 0’s are easy to check so let us just do the ,’s.
Suppose F ' FpgKD45. Let |F | = n and suppose F )' G!n. Let w generate F .
As KD45 $ !(!p # p) we have w-+ ' G!n%1. In case wRw then by 5 we have
that for all x, xRw and thus F ' G!n which is not so. If xRw for some x )= w
then as also wRx we get by w4 that wRw, which we already excluded. Thus
F ' G!"n%1.
Suppose F ' FpgS4w5. Let |F | = n and suppose F )' G!n. Let w generate F .
By reflexiveness and weak-euclidean-ness of F we have w-+ ' G!n%1. In case for
some x )= w we have xRw then for all x )= w, xRw and F ' G!n which is not so.
Thus F ' G!•n%1.
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Suppose F ' FpgKw4ww5. Let |F | = n and suppose F )' Gn. Let w generate
F . By weak-weak-euclidean-ness we have for all x, y ' w-+, if x )= y then xRy.
Thus w-+ ' Gn%1. Suppose there exist x )= w such that xRw. Then by w4 for
all x )= w, xRw and thus F )' Gn which is not so. Thus F )' G"n%1 + G•n%1.
Theorem 2.7. Let F = %W,R& be a p.g. Kw4ww5 frame and let P be a finite
set of P.V.’s If M = %F,#& is a model based on F then there exists
1. a finite and distinguishing model N and
2. a P-bounded morphism from M onto N .
Proof. Let F be generated by w0. For x, y ' M put
x 1 y i$ /p'P M, x # p 2 M,y # p
and
|x| = {x# | x# 1 x} .
First let N # = %W #, R#,##& where
• W # = {|x| | x )= w0} ,
• |x|R#|y| i$ 3x# ' |x|3y# ' |y|x#Ry# ,
• N #, |x| # p i$ M,x # p and p ' P .
Notice that we still could have |w0| ' W #. We will first show that
/x )= w0/z )= w0(|x|R#|z|# 3z# ' |z|xRz#) . (5)
Let x )= w0 and z )= w0. In case x )= z we have xRz. In case x = z then |x|R#|z|
only if there exits z# )= z and z# ' |z| or xRx. Thus we have show (5).
Suppose that there exists x0 )= w0 such that x0 1 w0 and |x0|R#|x0|. Notice
that
/x |x0|R#|x| . (6)
Define g : M 4# N # by
g(x) =
"
|x| if x )= w0 ,
|x0| otherwise.
We will now show that
/z (g(w0)R#g(z) # 3z# (g(z#) = g(z) ! w0Rz#)) . (7)
In case z = w0 let z# = x0 and in case z )= w0 take z# = z.
Since N # is clearly distinguishing the lemma will be shown in this case if g is
a P -bounded morphism Clearly M,x # p i$ N #, g(x) # p for all p ' P . Assume
xRy. In case both x, y )= w0 then also g(x) = |x|R#|y| = g(y). In case x = w0
then g(x) = |x0| and thus by (6) we get g(x) = |x0|R#g(y). Assume g(x)R#g(y).
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Since g(x0) = g(w0) we can assume w.l.o.g. that y )= w0. In case x = w0 then
we find some y# with g(y#) = g(y) and xRy# by (7). In case x )= w0 we find such
a y# using (5).
Now let us assume that no such x0 exist. Put
N =
"
(N #)• if w0Rw0 ,
(N #)" otherwise.
Let us write ! for the root of N (! = • in case w0Rw0 and ! = * otherwise).
Define f : M 4# N by
f(x) =
"
|x| if x )= w0 ,
! otherwise.
That f is a P -bounded morphism can now be shown just using (5) and thus we
are done if we can show that N is distinguishing. For each x let
#x =
#
{p | x # p, p ' P} !
#
{¬p | x )# p, p ' P} .
If for some x )= w0, x 1 w0. Then we do not have |x|R#|x| and thus
|x| # !¬#x and ! # "#x. Thus if we put
"|x| =
"
#x x )1 w0 ,
#x !!¬#x x 1 w0
and
"! = #x ! "#x
then for all n, m ' N , m # "n i$ n = m. In case no such x exist then we can
simply put "|x| = #x and "! = #w0 .
Corollary 2.8. Any extension L of Kw4ww5 has the finite frame property
Proof. Let L be any extension of Kw4ww5 and suppose L )# A. Let M be the
sub-model of the canonical model of L generated by a MCS ! with ¬A ' !.
Apply Theorem 2.7 with P = PV (A) to obtain a finite distinguishing model
N that is a bounded morphic image of a definable variant of M that falsifies
A at some world v. As M validates L so does N . And as N is finite and
distinguishing its underlying frame is a frame for L.
3 Interpreting Knowledge into Belief
In this section we set out the general idea for which two special cases are worked
out in Section 4 and Section 5 below.
The most prominent logics of knowledge in the propositional modal setting
found in the literature are S4 and S5 [FHMV95]. Logics of belief are usually
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obtained from these logics by dropping the T scheme and adding D, thus obtain-
ing KD4 and KD45. As such belief is thus taken to be knowledge without the
assurance that what we know is true, though our believes should be consistent.
Or conversely, knowledge should be obtainable from belief as soon as we find
out that what we belief is true. In line with this we will consider the following
translation " from modal formulas A to modal formulas A!.
Definition 3.1 (Interpretation of Knowledge in Belief). For any formula A
define a formula A! with induction on A as follows.
! p! = p ,
! 5! = 5 ,
! (A # B)! = A! # B! ,
! (!A)! = !A! !A! .
The translation " is a well-studied object in the field of provability logics.
Using this translation a formal provability interpretation can be given to the !
that, unlike GL, preserves S4 [Boo93]. No further reference to these uses of the
translation " are made in this paper so let us go back to the problem at hand.
Let Lk be a logic of knowledge and let Lb be a logic of belief (not necessarily
any of the above, the reader can take his favorite system). If A is a modal
formula then the validity of A when interpreting the ! as ‘knowing’ is thus
formally expressed by Lk $ A. Similarly the validity of A when interpreting
the ! as ‘believing’ is expressed by Lb $ A. If we now agree that knowledge is
defined to be true belief then the validity of A in the knowledge interpretation
can also be formally expressed as Lb $ A!, and if we agree that knowledge is true
belief then it is desirable, if not mandatory that these two match up. We thus
ask ourselves the following two questions. Take Lk = S5, find all the normal
modal logics Lb such that
S5 $ A i$ Lb $ A! . (8)
Similarly if we take Lb = KD45, find the unique normal modal logic Lk and all
the normal modal logics L#b such that
Lk $ A i$ KD45 $ A! i$ L#b $ A! . (9)
In more fancy terms we thus look for Lb that faithfully interprets S5 respectively
look for Lk such that KD45 faithfully interprets Lk.
There are of course more choices for Lk and Lb to start of with than just S5
and KD45. Among the standard schemes considered in epistemic logic it is the
5 scheme that, as far as the line of the research of this paper goes is the least
trivial. We therefore restrict ourselves to logics that contain this scheme.
We finish with some basic facts that come in handy in the rest of the paper.
Lemma 3.2. K $ A! 6 A!!
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Proof. Induction on A. The base case and propositional connectives are trivial
and so is the ! case since if A 7 !B then A! 7 !B! !B! and A!! 7 !B!! !
B!! !B!!.
Lemma 3.3. Let M = %W,R, #& be a model Then for all w ' W and all
formulas A we have M!, w # A i! M,w # A!
Proof. In what follows we write x # for M,x # and x,#! for M!, x #. We
show the lemma with induction on A. The base case and the cases for the
propositional connectives are trivial. So assume A 7 !B. (8) If w )#! !B
then there exists v with wR!v #! ¬B. By (IH) we get v # ¬B! and since wR!v
implies w = v or wRv we get w # ¬B! ( ¬!B! and thus w )# B! !!B!. (9)
If wRv then wR!v thus v #! B and thus again by (IH) v # B!. This implies
w # !B!. Moreover by reflexivity of R! we get w #! B, thus by (IH) w # B!
and thus w # (!B)!.
Notice that this lemma can be used in two ways, we either start with M
and construct M! by adding all pairs %x, x& for x ' W to R, or we start with
a reflexive model M! and remove some, but not necessarily all, of those pairs
from R! to obtain R.
Corollary 3.4. T $ A 6 A!
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 A 6 A! is valid on all reflexive frames and thus the
corollary follows from the completeness of T for such frames.
4 Interpreting S5 Knowledge into Belief
In this section we find all solutions for (8). We will do this as follows. We
will first find two solutions to (8) (Theorem 4.1 and 4.2) and then show that
any other extends one of these (Theorem 4.3) and is contained in the other
(Theorem 4.5).
Theorem 4.1. S5 $ A i! S5 $ A!
Proof. By Corollary 3.4 above.
Theorem 4.2. S5 $ A i! Kw4B $ A!
Proof. It is easy to see that S5 $ A implies Kw4B $ A!. Suppose that S5 )$ A.
Then there exists a model M = %W,R, #& such that R is an equivalence on W
and w ' W with w # ¬A. In particular R is weakly transitive and symmetric
and thus M is also a Kw4B model. Moreover since R is reflexive by Lemma 3.3
we get w # ¬A! and thus Kw4B )$ A!.
Theorem 4.3. If for all A, S5 $ A i! L $ A! then Kw4B , L
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Proof. Let L be any normal modal logic satisfying the conditions of the lemma.
That L $ !A !A # !!A is clear. To show that L $ A # !"A note that
("B # "!B)! = "B! (B! # !("B! (B!) ! ("B! (B!) .
Thus if ("B # "!B)! is provable for an arbitrary formula B then so is
B! # !(¬B! # "B!) .
Thus KwB , L and by Lemma 2.1 L $ A # !"A.
Lemma 4.4. Let m . 1 and F ' G!m. Then for any n . 2m and any F # ' Gn
there exists a bounded morphism from F # onto F
Proof. Any function f : F # 4# F with |f(x)%1| . 2 is a bounded morphism
Theorem 4.5. If for all A, S5 $ A i! L $ A!. Then L , S5
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the theorem and suppose for a contradiction
that L ), S5. By Theorem 4.3 we have Kw4B , L. As
!
m$1 G!m are just the
finite S5 frames there exists some n such that for all m . n, G!m :FL = ;. But
then by Lemma 4.4 we thus have that for all m . 2n, Gm : FL = ;. Choose
k . 1 such that 2k . 2n. Let
% = {p1 ! · · · ! pk | pi ' {pi,¬pi}} .
Let #1, . . . ,#2k be an enumeration of %. We have
FL |= (!¬#1 ! ¬#1) ( · · · ( (!¬#2k ! ¬#2k) .
And as Kw4B extends Kw4ww5 we thus have by Corollary 2.8 that
L $ (!¬#1 ! ¬#1) ( · · · ( (!¬#2k ! ¬#2k)
which by the assumption of the theorem implies
S4w5 $ !¬#1 ( · · · (!¬#2k .
Which is clearly not so.
5 Interpreting S4w5 Knowledge into Belief
In this section we find all solutions to (9). This will be done as follows. First we
will find three solutions to (2) (Theorem 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). Then we will show
that any other solution extends one of these (Theorem 5.6) and is contained in
either of the other two (Theorem 5.9).
We start with two lemmata that will be helpful in finding a solution to (2).
Lemma 5.1. Let %W,R& be an S4w5 frame and let R# be defined as xR#y i!
xRy and if x = y then there exists v )= x such that vRx. Then %W,R#& is an
K45 frame
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Proof. Suppose xR#yR#z. We have xRyRz thus xRz and thus in case x )= z we
have xR#z. Now assume x = z. In case y = x we are done at once and in case
y )= x we have xR#z.
Suppose wRx, y. Then wRx, y and thus if x )= w we have yRx. Additionally
if y )= x we get yR#x immediately and if y = x then we get yR#x since wRx and
x )= w. Now suppose x = w. We thus want to show that yR#w and we thus can
assume that y )= w. Since wRw there exists some u )= w such that uRw. By
transitivity of R we get uRy since if u = y we would be done we can assume
that u )= y and thus by w5 we get yRw. Since w )= y we conclude yR#w.
Lemma 5.2. For any formula A, K45 $ A! i! KD45 $ A!
Proof. Suppose K45 )$ A!. Let %W,R, #& be a K45 model, w ' W and w # ¬A!.
In case w # "< then K45 )$ "< # A! and thus as K45 $ "< # !"< we
have KD45 )$ A!. In case w # !5 then we can assume that W = {w}. Let
R# = R+ {%w,w&} and M # = %W,R# ##&. By Lemma 3.2 w # ¬A!! and we thus
have by Lemma 3.3 that w ## ¬A!. Clearly M # is an KD45 model and thus
KD45 )$ A!.
Theorem 5.3. S4w5 $ A i! KD45 $ A!
Proof. For the left to right direction we will only show
KD45 $ ("A ! ¬A # !"A)! . (10)
We have
("A ! ¬A # !"A)! =
("A! ( A!) ! ¬A! # !("A! (A!) ! ("A! ( A!) .
Thus (10) follows since KD45 $ "A! # !("A! (A!).
For the right to left direction suppose that S4w5 )$ A. As S4w5 is complete
we find a S4w5 Kripke model M! = %W,R!,#!& and w ' W such that w )#! A.
Applying Lemma 5.1 we find a K45 model M = %W,R, #& such that R! =
R + {%x, x& | x ' W}. Thus by Lemma 3.3 we have w )# A! thus K45 )$ A! and
thus by Lemma 5.2 KD45 )$ A!.
Theorem 5.4. S4w5 $ A i! S4w5 $ A!
Proof. By Corollary 3.4.
Theorem 5.5. S4w5 $ A i! Kw4ww5 $ A!
Proof. The right to left direction follows from Kw4ww5 , S4w5 and Corollary
3.4. For the left to right direction it is enough to show that for any formula A
Kw4ww5 $ (!A # !!A)! (11)
and
Kw4ww5 $ ("A ! ¬A # !"A)! . (12)
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(11) is clear. To show (12) note that
("A ! ¬A # !"A)! =
("A! (A!) ! ¬A! # !("A! (A!) ! ("A! (A!) .
From which (12) follows.
Theorem 5.6. If for all A, S4w5 $ A i! L $ A! then Kw4ww5 , L
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the theorem. We clearly have Kw4 , L. We
have
("p ! ¬p # !"p)! = ("p ( p) ! ¬p # !("p ( p) ! ("p ( p)) .
Thus as L $ ("p ! ¬p # !"p)! we also have
L $ "p ! ¬p # !("p ( p)
and thus also Kww5 , L.
Lemma 5.7. Let 2k = m,
1. if F ' G"m and F # ' G!k
" then there exists a bounded morphism from F
onto F #,
2. if F ' G•m and F # ' G!k
• then there exists a bounded morphism from F
onto F #.
Proof. In both cases any function f : F 4# F # with |f(x)%1| . 2 is a bounded
morphism
Corollary 5.8. If Kw4ww5 , L, L ), KD45 and L ), S4w5 then there exists
k . 1 such that F ' FpgL and |F | = m . k then F ' Gm.
Proof. If L ), KD45 then, as by Corollary 2.8 KD45 has the finite frame property,
there exists some u and a frame F ' G!u" + G!u such that F )' F
pg
L . By possibly
adjoining a root to F we can assume that F ' G!u". Similarly since L ), S4w5
there exists some v and F2 ' G!v• such that F2 )' F
pg
L .
Let k = 2 · max(u, v). Now as Kw4ww5 , L we have that for all F ' FpgL if
|F | = m then F ' G"m + G•m + Gm. By choice of k and Lemma 5.7 we thus get
that if k = m then F ' Gm.
Theorem 5.9. If for all A, S4w5 $ A i! L $ A! then L , KD45 or L , S4w5
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the theorem and assume for a contradiction
that L ), KD45 and L ), S4w5. By Theorem 5.6 we get Kw4ww5 , L. Let k be
as given by Corollary 5.8. Let n be such that 2n . k + 1. Let
% = {p1 ! · · · ! pn | pi ' {pi,¬pi}} .
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Let #1, . . . , p2n be some enumeration of %. By the conclusion of Corollary 5.8
we thus have
FpgL |= ("#1 ( #1) ! · · · ! ("#2n ( #2n) # (r # !"r) .
By Corollary 2.8 we thus have
L $ ("#1 ( #1) ! · · · ! ("#2n ( #2n) # (r # !"r)
and thus also
L $ ("#1 ( #1) ! · · · ! ("#2n ( #2n) # (r # !("r ( r) ! ("r ( r)) .
But then we must have
S4w5 $ "#1 ! · · · ! "#2n # (r # !"r)
which is clearly not so.
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